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Abstract
This article develops a reading of Don DeLillo’s novel Cosmopolis that differentiates between
two thematic and poetological axes running through the text. On the one hand, Cosmopolis
explores the future-fixation of the risk regime of finance capitalism; on the other, it stages
scenes of insecurity that physically threaten the protagonist and his world. Insecurity, the
article argues, is a condition that throughout the text increasingly gains in appeal because it
promises to offer an alternative to a world of managed risk. The concern with security
emphasizes finitude and mortality, thus enabling a turn to existential matters that the virtual
abstractions of finance have seemingly made inaccessible. While proposing an opposition
between a logic of risk based on virtuality and a logic of (in)security based on authenticity,
DeLillo’s novel also suggests that it is impossible to break out of the logic of risk management
pervading late modernity. The appeal of (in)security articulated in Cosmopolis rather lies in the
promise to existentially revitalize life within the confines of financialized capitalism.
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Introduction
Don DeLillo may justly be considered America’s foremost novelist of terrorism. From his
earliest works, like Players (1977) and The Names (1982), to his magisterial Libra (1989) and
Mao II (1991), down to his 9/11 novel Falling Man (2007), the figure of the terrorist has
ambiguously embodied both the culmination of a postmodern culture controlled by media
representations and the violent kernel of the real that breaks with the primacy of the sign. In
several recent additions to his oeuvre, DeLillo has re-calibrated this long-standing fictional
exploration of terrorism by turning his attention to the theme of security. In particular,
Cosmopolis (2003) and Point Omega (2010) address different aspects of the imposing
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obsessed with his private security apparatus, while Richard Elster, in Point Omega, has made
a career as a consultant for the security strategists of the state. In what follows, I will explore
what functions this turn to security has had for DeLillo, and speculate on the larger purpose
security has for contemporary culture, particularly against the backdrop of the utilization of the
future in the financialized world of late capitalism. My argument will focus on Cosmopolis, as I
read this novel as a fictional exploration of the possibility of integrating security (understood as
a temporal orientation toward death and a heightened awareness of corporeality) into the
abstract world of finance.
In DeLillo’s earlier novels, the terrorist tended to embody a force with the capacity to
resist what these texts conceptualized as the virtualization of a late capitalist world saturated
with commodities and accessible to experience only in mass-mediated form. This is true even
if DeLillo’s terrorists, too, had to work within the logic of the media spectacle. The turn to
security allows DeLillo to suggest a possibility of breaking through the shield of the virtual. He
thus manages to narratively explore a generalized experience of life under threat. The
importance of threat in DeLillo’s security novels already suggests a key premise of the literary
life of security: the concern with security is less about feelings of safety and freedom from
worry than it is about a confrontation with insecurity.
I will expand my understanding of the concept of security in the opening section of this
article by contrasting it with the now dominant understanding of security as a tool of affective
politics. These conceptual considerations will help situate security in the larger framework of
uncertainty in modernity. I will then move to Cosmopolis, illustrating how DeLillo develops the
theme of security in dialogue with that of financial risk. In order to understand how the
presence of security in Cosmopolis instigates a turn to questions often associated with
existential philosophy, it will be necessary to show in detail how the novel positions the
concern with security in relation to the technologies and temporality of financialization. It
should be made clear from the outset that DeLillo resists a simple opposition between the
virtuality of financial speculation and the existential dimension of physical life defined by
threats to security. Rather, the novel insists that once life has been thoroughly financialized, it
is no longer possible to simply ‘return to the real’, to use Hal Foster’s (1996) resonant phrase.
Yet rather than dampening the appeal of security, this caveat only boosts its promise. Security
manages both to counteract the virtuality of speculation (by bringing into focus our physical
vulnerability) and to join forces with the virtual, for – similar to the risk-driven world of finance
capitalism – security acts on the present by creating scenarios of the future which are by
definition mere potentials.
Security, fear, and the limits of affect theory
Over the last decades, political theorists, social scientists, and critical humanists have
explored the logic, discourse, and practice of security as a political rationality that threatens to
undermine the principles of democracy and delegitimize basic rights. Building on this
important insight, a frequently rehearsed argument proposes that people willingly endure the
plethora of security measures imposed by authorities in the face of insecurity so long as these
measures promise to make them feel secure once more. The concern with security, from this
vantage point, is all about the alleviation of fear. Security is seen as both a norm and operative
trigger of a ‘culture of fear’.1 Joseph Masco (2014) summarizes this position in reference to
the development of US security measures. “By amplifying official terror and public anxiety,” he
suggests, “the US security apparatus [has] powerfully remade itself in the early twenty-first
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century, proliferating experts, technological infrastructures, and global capacities in the name
of existential defense” (Masco, 2014: 1).
In his explanation of why people accept the rationality of security, Masco follows a line of
argument that has become increasingly influential since the rise of affect theory, tracing “how
the affective politics of the Cold War nuclear state both enabled, and – after 2001 – were
transformed into those of the counterterror state” (Masco, 2014: 2). Put simply, this
explanation hinges on the idea that state officials can control the population through a
manipulation of collective affects.2 Following this presumption, however, risks an intellectually
unsatisfactory behaviorism. I suggest that we need to come up with alternative answers to the
question of why the concept of security has had such persuasive force in public discourse,
answers that take into consideration the experience of (in)security. Finding such alternatives
requires rethinking the very concept of security. While we ought not to lose a critical
perspective on how security is deployed for anti-democratic, oppressive, and violent policies,
we should also not presume that we already know what security is. For this reason, I argue, it
is helpful to look to literature, for an important strand of American fiction has approached
problems of security and insecurity by valorizing them in diametrically opposed fashion to
today’s critical discourse. Across different genres and periods, American writers from the early
republic to the present share an unspoken conviction: the concern with security allows us to
explore, experience, make use of, and even take pleasure in, insecurity. In the worlds created
by this literature, insecurity is much more than a fearful encounter with threat. Being insecure
creates new possibilities and opens up spaces.3 We will see below how this plays out in
DeLillo’s work. But before we get there, I will spell out the concept of security suggested by the
valorization of insecurity found in much modern fiction.
Security becomes a matter of concern when there is a perception of a malevolent threat
that creates a sense of insecurity. The threat may appear as imminent or remote, concrete or
vague, but in any case it exists as a potential future that has yet to arrive. All threats are in this
sense merely possible threats, however dangerous they may appear. But while fear plays a
central role in the encounter with threat, it is important to avoid thinking of fear primarily as a
stultifying, incapacitating affect. Otherwise it will remain a mystery how insecurity in literature
can become the occasion for a productive and even pleasurable experience. To solve this
mystery, we need to pay attention to the temporal structure of fear.
As Lars Svendsen (2008: 39) observes, “fear always contains a protention, a future
projection, concerning pain, injury or death”. In this way, “The core of fear is the assumption of
a negative future situation. Although not every negative future situation gives rise to fear,
something has to be at stake”. Svendsen here points our attention away from the sheer feeling
of fear, and toward the cognitive operations at work in the production of that feeling. Fear is
always future-oriented, but it is also inherently dialectic. Time is not merely structured around
a future of loss, but also by the wish or desire to retain whatever is threatened. Fear is thus an
emotion that is essentially temporal, a way of relating to the future torn between the possibility
of loss and the wish to retain what might be lost.
To slightly rephrase this idea, we can think of fear as bound up with desire; both fear and
desire are reliant on time and, in turn, help structure time. Recently, Martin Hägglund (2012)
has sharpened this thought by coining a pair of terms that give expression to the dialectic
entanglement of fear and desire against the horizon of time:
The key argument here concerns the co-implication of chronophobia and chronophilia. The fear of time and
death does not stem from a metaphysical desire to transcend temporal life. On the contrary, it is generated
by the investment in a life that can be lost. It is because one is attached to a temporal being (chronophilia)
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that one fears losing it (chronophobia). Care in general, I argue, depends on such a double bind. On the one
hand, care is necessarily chronophilic, since only something that is subject to the possibility of loss—and
hence temporal—can give one a reason to care. On the other hand, care is necessarily chronophobic, since
one cannot care about something without fearing what may happen to it. (Hägglund, 2012: 9-10)
Hägglund here provides a crucial link between fear and security. His explication of our double
bind to time – we experience the projection of the future as both fearful (the passing of time
presupposes loss) and full of desire (in wishing to prevent loss, we desire our continuing bond
to the temporal unfolding of the future) – provides the structure of the experience of ‘care’.
Etymologically and conceptually, care lies at the core of the notion of security (securitas),
which Cicero introduced as a neologism derived from sine/se and cura, and which he initially
comprehended as a mental state of calm (literally a state ‘without care’), to be distinguished
from salus, which denoted physical safety.
As John Hamilton (2013: 53) has pointed out in his recent philological exploration of
security, classical securitas, drawing on the Epicurean ataraxia (freedom from disturbances)
and the Stoic apatheia (freedom from passions), conceptualizes the removal of care (or fear)
as bound up with the same kind of dialectical co-implication we see at work in chronophilia
and chronophobia. If security is to protect life, rather than usher in a death-like state of
lifelessness, sine cura cannot be located outside of time and contingency. The fearlessness of
sine cura can only benefit life if it remains within time, but this means that the care-free life of
securitas is unthinkable without the continuing need for care. From its earliest theorizations,
we can reconstruct security as complementing fear: together, both terms give expression to
the double bind of an open future (that is, to our twofold being bound to it) in which the threat
of death and the desire for life meet and mingle.
But if the future is open, the mental and affective operations of security are not limited to
the fearful contemplation of threat and the desire to stay alive. The projection of the future
operative in the emotion of fear not only indicates that the future is insecure, but also that it is
uncertain. The difference is crucial. Uncertainty neutrally refers to the fact that the future is yet
to actualize and that it may do so in different ways. Insecurity, on the other hand, regards the
future as harmful, and so constitutes one particular scenario constructed from the uncertainty
of the future.
It is the uncertainty of the future that makes possible a second dimension of security,
consisting in the belief that the threats looming in the uncertain future can be answered; that
there are, in fact, alternative future courses of events. Here lies the emancipatory promise of
security’s concern with the potentially harmful uncertainty of the future. In the act of
responding to insecurity, the subject of security turns the uncertainty of the future to his or her
own favor. Security entails the promise that up to a certain point, the uncertain future can be
rationally designed and controlled.
My conception of security thus highlights the interplay, articulated in much of American
literature, of the fearful encounter of threat with the possibility of responding to it. This
interplay is complex in the sense that these two dimensions battle, but also sustain, each
other. Security, then, relates to a distinctly modern grammar of agency, according to which
rationality appears as bound up with and conditioned by what exceeds its reach.
As I have already indicated, what makes this grammar of agency particularly modern is
the understanding of time that underlies it. Driven by the aim to remain within time (which as
Hägglund [2012] and Hamilton [2013] suggest, means not merely to survive, but also to
remain exposed to uncertainty and even insecurity), security amounts to a concern that would
have been unrecognizable to the pre-moderns. As Charles Taylor (2007) and others have
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pointed out, in pre-modern thought, the temporal realm stood in opposition to varying versions
of higher time. The temporal existence of the saeculum was generally viewed as a transitional
stage that was followed by the entry into eternity – no matter whether eternity was thought of,
in the Platonic tradition, as the realm of the unchanging, full being of Ideas, or, in the Christian
belief pattern first fully expressed by Augustine, as the “gathered time” that draws together the
past and the future into the divine present (Taylor, 2007: 54).
Thinking in terms of ‘security’ is therefore dependent upon a worldview in which the
future is temporal and secular, rather than spiritual and eternal, such that the future becomes
a matter of human care or concern, open to being shaped by human rationality. At the same
time, the fact that the future is construed as an open-ended contingency structured by fear
and desire indicates, once again, that attempts to take care of the future are predicated on
the impossibility of fully bringing it under control.
In sum, it is insufficient to think of the concern with security necessitated by threat simply
as an affective trigger that will induce people to surrender to political passivity. Rather than
being a manipulative mechanism that necessarily facilitates authoritarian rule, the concern
with security alerts subjects to their responsibility to shape an open future, while
simultaneously confronting them with their limitations in trying to do so. Since the rise of the
novel, writers engaged in this genre have brought to light and explored this double bind of fear
and desire, of the potential loss of life and the wish to ensure survival, of power and
powerlessness. It is for these reasons that the insecurity highlighted by the concern with
security has been such a productive force: with the modern understanding of time, life itself
hinges on the possibility of death. This brings us directly to DeLillo’s Cosmopolis which, as I will
argue, gives this idea a particular twist – not only must death be a possibility if life is to be
worthy of its name; in order to ensure life in its temporal nature, the fact of (eventual) death
must, indeed, be recognized as a certainty and incorporated into present life.
‘Cosmopolis’ and the time of risk
In order to make sense of the novel’s engagement with security, it is first necessary to explore
in some detail how DeLillo narrates the temporality of risk in the financial economy. My
starting premise here is that risk is a type of contingency management whose focus on the
uncertainty of the future relates to, but also fundamentally differs from, security. Security, as I
have elaborated in the previous section, creates an insecurity scenario out of the uncertain
future and defines this scenario as an existential threat. Financial risk, on the other hand,
construes uncertainty as a resource for potential gain. If risk calculations go wrong, the result
may be as fatal as in the scenario of insecurity. But in the case of risk, the motivation to
confront uncertainty is radically different. Rather than construing, as in the logic of security,
the reaction to threat as a necessity (which may create unexpected opportunities or openings,
and thus end up highlighting how threats are mere possibilities, rather than necessities), the
logic of risk pursues uncertainty because of its prospect of gain. As Elena Esposito (2011: 2)
puts it, with respect to the risk rationality of finance capitalism: “Financial markets ‘play’ with
[…] future possibilities, in that they intertwine and compensate, imagine and deny, and
produce present profits out of the unpredictability of the future. As a matter of fact, financial
markets do in a more daring way what money has always done. They deal with and trade in
tomorrow’s uncertainty today”.
Cosmopolis follows asset manager Eric Packer during the course of a day in April in the
year 2000, just before the collapse of the dotcom bubble of the 1990s, which we are implicitly
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asked to interpret not merely as the end of a millennium, but as the millennial end of an
epoch. Wandering through his luxury triplex apartment located on the top floors of a building
which seems to be modeled after Trump Tower, Packer begins his day by deciding on a whim to
“get a haircut”4 in the neighborhood of his childhood – a self-destructive wish considering that
‘getting a haircut’ has recently come to refer to taking heavy financial losses.5 His armored
limousine takes him from luxury to shabbiness along 47th street all the way to Hell’s Kitchen.
Backtracking his career from splendor to humble beginnings, DeLillo sends Packer on a
homeward journey resonant with the Classical tradition. Keeping with the episodic structure of
the Homeric epic, Packer is intermittently joined by his ‘chief of security’, ‘chief of technology’,
and ‘chief of theory’. Perennially stuck in traffic, his daylong trip leaves him enough time to
have meals in several restaurants, hang about in hotels, have sex with four different women,
watch the assassination of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) managing director on the
screens of his car, begrudge the US President his even larger security apparatus, become
witness to and target of an anti-globalization protest, and squander “his personal fortune in
the tens of billions” (121) – as well as the more than seven hundred million belonging to his
wife (124) – in the financial markets. All through the day, Packer’s security team receives more
or less unspecified threats. Though initially all efforts are made to prevent harm, Packer will
ultimately seek out his assassin, who will duly serve his office and so complement Packer’s
financial ruin. The novel comes to a close as its two thematic axes, currency speculation and
security management, reveal a shared longing for death.
The focus on the dealings of a mega-rich currency trader – a risk professional, we might
say – allows DeLillo to flesh out what it might mean to “liv[e] in the future” (78), as one of the
characters describes the temporality of risk. To get at that meaning, DeLillo juxtaposes two
registers of representation. On one level, Packer’s behavior captures certain features of
financial trading. This representation can be called realistic in the narrow sense that it refers
to standard procedures of real-life finance capitalism, including stock forecasting and a typical
hedge fund operation, in which selling short (speculating on falling prices) is ‘hedged’ by going
long (speculating on rising prices). But on top of that, DeLillo also presents us with a
fictionalized version of the risk economy in which the discourse of real-life finance capitalism
is poetically distorted, exaggerated, or pushed to its logical conclusions through aesthetic
means.
On this second level, Cosmopolis emphasizes what inhabiting the future would feel like.
Taken to its most radical conclusion, DeLillo’s novel suggests, the future-orientation of the
markets leads to a sense of timelessness. As life becomes entrenched in the virtuality of the
future, the future ironically begins to recover its pre-modern function as sheer fate. But in
contrast to the pre-modern subject, the postmodern subject of DeLillo’s novel encounters the
future’s blows as if in a ghostly state of numbness and shock. As I will show now, DeLillo
creates the effect of a timeless, ghostly, and uncontrollable future by combining aesthetic
strategies on the level of plot structure, style, and motifs.
Regarding plot structure, Cosmopolis riffs on the tradition of the Homeric epic. More
precisely, DeLillo references the Odyssey in its modernist, nineteenth-century, and classical
variants. With respect to temporality, the most important adaptations of the epic come from
the Odyssey itself. Most significantly, it is the adoption of the epic’s loose and episodic
structuring of incidents that leads to a particular perception of time. In The Specter of Capital,
Joseph Vogl (2015: 6) keenly observes that while the modern novel is concerned with the rules
that provide order for singular events, in Cosmopolis, events appear as “external forces and
hardships that ultimately take a turn for the worse as they interconnect and escalate in a
fateful way”. Vogl emphasizes the convergence between the events of the novel and the utter
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failure of Packer’s investments: “The erratic course that draws DeLillo’s protagonist from one
incident to another and on to his death is shadowed or doubled by a wild run on the currency
market: ‘against expectations’ [8], the Japanese yen climbs ever higher until nothing can stop
its rise: Packer Capital’s holdings are wiped out and its CEO is ruined” (Vogl, 2015: 7-8). Life in
times of finance capitalism, according to Vogl’s take on DeLillo, has regressed into archaic
conditions, the result of which being that humans must interpret seemingly inexplicable
calamities as blows of fate. The epic is the proper genre for this helplessness vis-à-vis the
world out there, even if it is humans themselves who have created the uncontrollable monster
that is the financial markets.
But the episodic structure of Cosmopolis culminates not merely in an erratic course of
events to which Packer is subjected; it moreover establishes a particular temporality in which
episodic elements fail to create a rational sense of time. The episodic character of incidents
that I stress here does not mean that the epic in general, or this novel-epic in particular, is
without a plot. Nonetheless, scenes tend to be cut short and turn into shredded, disconnected
memories. The text’s episodic nature pushes the sense-making capacity of narrative to its
limits, even while the overall narrative thrust of the homecoming plot continues to move
forward. This narrative leveling effect has ramifications for the novel’s temporal order. Because
there is no recognizable structure of cause and effect, the order of the novel’s incidents
remains random. Which of the women did Packer meet first? Did he stop by the techno rave
before or after he watches the assassination of the IMF managing director on his screen? The
reason why the temporal order is difficult to reconstruct is that these events happen on the
same logical plane and the same sheet of time. Their order of telling is a matter of space
(literally, space on paper), and not of time.
This temporal leveling effect is reinforced by a similar effect in the dimension of style. The
reception of Cosmopolis in the press was anything but enthusiastic, and one of the recurring
criticisms directed at DeLillo had to do with his tendency to inflate the banal to the near-
sublime. As John Updike (2003: para. 12) complained in The New Yorker, “DeLillo’s fervent
intelligence and his fastidious, edgy prose […] weave halos of import around every event,
however far-fetched and random”.6 Updike’s descriptions are perceptive, but their inflexible
fidelity to the normative horizon of literary realism, centered on plausibility and psychological
character development, blinds them to the function DeLillo’s style has for the aesthetic
rendition of futurity. The de-hierarchized sequence of events, each of which glows in a ‘halo of
import’, is less a failed attempt at realism than yet another means of undermining the
narrative time of plot. Rather than progressing and developing, Cosmopolis strings together
moments of high intensity which, in their seriality, become monotonous and begin to cancel
each other out. One may or may not appreciate this effect in a novel, but it does contribute to
DeLillo’s aesthetic rendition of ‘living in the future’ as a state in which the future no longer
supplies a horizon of contingency for the present.
These considerations of narrative structure and style at least partially concern the
aesthetic effect of the book, and thus address the aesthetic experience of the reader.
Matching his reception aesthetics with a corresponding production aesthetics, DeLillo devises
aesthetic strategies on the level of motif and dialogue. Two sets of recurring motifs in his
repertoire suggest that the “global consciousness” of “living in the future” – as DeLillo (2001:
33) puts it in his essay, ‘In the ruins of the future’ – calls into question the very idea of the
future. The first of these regards the characters’ interaction with the materiality of signs. The
fascination with the sign, word, or letter is likely to be familiar to all readers of DeLillo, since it
runs more or less throughout his entire oeuvre. In Cosmopolis, it is the materiality of economic
information as it appears on the screens inside Packer’s limousine that seems to transport the
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characters towards immanent transcendence – or perhaps, more precisely, towards an erotic
experience. Packer’s ‘chief of theory’, Vija Kinski, goes furthest in emancipating the aesthetics
of data from the information it contains. Having joined Packer in his car after emerging from
the Church of Saint Mary the Virgin – which “was curious but maybe it wasn’t” (78) – she
confesses: “Oh and this car, which I love. The glow of the screens. I love the screens. The glow
of cyber-capital. So radiant and seductive. I understand none of it” (78). Her very sentences,
insistent in their rhythm, fragmented in grammar, convey a sense of rapture. It is at this
moment that Kinski – paid for producing ideas, that is, statements about matters she claims
unable to grasp – ruminates on the future:
The idea is time. Living in the future. Look at those numbers running. Money makes time. It used to be the
other way around. Clock time accelerated the rise of capitalism. People stopped thinking about eternity.
They began to concentrate on hours, measurable hours, man-hours, using labor more efficiently. […] It’s
cyber-capital that creates the future. […] Because time is a corporate asset now. It belongs to the free
market system. The present is harder to find. It is being sucked out of the world to make way for the future
of uncontrolled markets and huge investment potential. The future becomes insistent. (79)
Here we see why Updike describes DeLillo’s characters as “spout[ing] smart, swift essays at
one another” (Updike, 2003: para. 9). But the device of the ‘chief of theory’ pushes this
tendency to self-reflexive extremes: Kinski’s outburst possesses just enough lucidity to be read
as a theory of time and informational capitalism. She quite accurately sketches the transition
from time as a function of efficiency in industrial capitalism to time traded as a commodity in
the credit economy of finance capitalism. But as she reflects on “living in the future”, what
starts as an erotic, seductive experience of looking “at those numbers running” is transformed
into an ominous vision of life in a lethal vacuum: the present “is being sucked out of the world”
to make space for markets whose uncontrollability begins to appear distinctly sinister. The
vertiginous future that becomes palpable on the computer screens no longer offers any sense
of present tense. It has turned into a dark power that insists on its own rule. While Packer’s
financial speculation aspires to match the present with the future, Kinski’s theoretical flight of
fancy rids the future of the present, leaving the self in a state of dizzying powerlessness.
The second dominant cluster of motifs in Cosmopolis insists on the outmodedness of the
present world and its rapid slide into the past. The obsolescence of the present, and the words
that catalog it, are subject to Packer’s complaints throughout the novel. The list of outmoded
things and concepts includes stretch limousines, whose disappearance will signal that the
“global era officially ends” (91); shooting at presidents (“I thought there were more stimulating
targets”, Packer grudgingly offers [20]); physical money; Packer himself (at the techno rave he
realizes that “an era had come and gone without him” [127]); the past (which is itself
“disappearing” [86]); and even novelty as such (“There’s no more danger in the new” [8]).
Obsolescence is a vortex that sucks up the coordinates of being, including the primary objects,
actors, and concepts that make up the novel. The world of Cosmopolis empties itself out to the
point where it affects the literary text itself. The theme of growing outdated metaleptically
jumps onto the level of the novel: as DeLillo employs and reemploys the hallmarks of virtuality
– from the abstractions of finance capitalism, the glow of screens, and the evaporation of
space, down to the well-worn topos of the Twin Towers that strive towards their own
annihilation (familiar from previous novels like Players [1977], Mao II [1991], and Underworld
[1998]) – Cosmopolis turns into a novel of negation. “Living in the future” is represented as a
state of being ‘no longer’, and the proper form for such a passé world is a literature that
palpably and self-consciously begins to fatigue itself. In presenting a world in negation, it
negates itself.
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As I have shown over the last few pages, DeLillo renders this lifelessness evident through
a range of aesthetic techniques, including an epic plot structure of suspended temporal
progression, a style of monotonous pathos, a motif-language that turns the material sign into a
determinist imperative rather than the basis for immanent transcendence, sketching the
present as fading into obsolescence. By this set of strategies, Cosmopolis conveys the
impression that the financial temporal imaginaries of “living in the future” create a present
without a future and a future without a present. The temporal order of financial risk keeps the
speculator imprisoned in a state deprived of any future horizon, and thus of any sensory
perceptions that could animate the subject. What Packer spitefully observes about the US
President turns out to be a self-description: “He was the undead. He lived in a state of occult
repose, waiting to be reanimated” (77).
The time of security
So far I have focused on the ways in which Cosmopolis creates the time of risk. In fact,
however, DeLillo confronts the time of risk with a different temporal order, which I call the time
of security. The make-up of this alternative temporality and its relation to the time of risk will
be the subject of this section. While the novel spells out the time of risk as a phenomenology
of “living in the future”, according to which the temporal progression of past-present-future is
replaced by a disorienting and sense-numbing suspension of progression, the time of security
keeps the end in sight: its horizon is limited by the existential scope of threat.
It might seem, then, that taken together, the logics of risk and security create a sense of
balance. The financial markets work according to the logic of risk: here, Packer seeks to profit
from the uncertainty of the open future. Physical life, by contrast, is approached from the logic
of security: here, Packer tries everything to ward off uncertainty. Indeed, this sense of balance
is evoked early on in the novel. Packer confidently bets against the yen and simultaneously
delights in the effectiveness of his security apparatus. We get detailed descriptions of the
special security features of Packer’s stretch limousine, and we see him communicate at length
about the diagnosis of threats. Packer continuously seeks reassurance from his security team
that his networks are “secure” (12) and “safe from penetration” (22). But as the novel
continues – and particularly as it enters its second half – it becomes clear that security plays a
key role in Cosmopolis not as a counterpoint to uncertainty, but rather as a way of restoring a
sense of reality that has been lost in the abstractions of finance capitalism. The security
apparatus is less an occasion for peace of mind than a motive force that turns the imagination
to potential threats. Security – its technology, personnel, and the practices carried out by
these – gives rise to a heightened sense of insecurity. It no longer counterbalances financial
uncertainty with physical safety, but rather creates an acute sense of danger that might help
break through the shock-absorbing shields of virtuality.
In the course of the novel, security, in fact, not only awakens the imagination to the
insecurity of threat and danger but also gives this imagination a particular value. Rather than
producing fear, insecurity becomes a source of thrill and excitement. When his ‘chief of
security’ recommends extra security measures in light of the threat to the president and the
attack on the managing director of the IMF, Packer muses (in the words of the narrator): “How
did he feel about additional security? He felt refreshed. The death of [IMF director] Arthur
Rapp was refreshing. The prospective dip in the yen was invigorating” (35).
As the novel progresses, Packer systematically reverses the direction in which the
technology of security is targeted. It is only logical that, for Packer, his real “enemy” (147) is
not the assassin who is supposedly out to kill him, but rather his ‘chief of security’, Torval. And
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it is strictly in line with this reversal that he will take Torval’s high-tech gun, use it to casually
shoot Torval, then leave body and weapon behind. If it is the function of the security apparatus
to awaken him to the thrill of insecurity, fulfilling that function ultimately requires obliterating
the apparatus itself.
In the early parts of the novel, the thrill of insecurity arises from taking extra security
measures which are linked to economic potential (“the prospective dip of the yen”). But
gradually, the excitement of insecurity is produced through the abuse of Packer’s security
apparatus at the same time as it becomes connected to financial hits. Insecurity and
economic failure begin to work in concert. Packer goes on a spending spree, borrowing huge
quantities of yen. Maximizing the risk of his supposedly hedged transactions, he approaches
an orgasmic state:
The yen spree was releasing Eric from the influence of his neocortex. He felt even freer than usual, attuned
to the registers of his lower brain and gaining distance from the need to take inspired action, make original
judgments, maintain independent principles and convictions, all the reasons why people are fucked up and
birds and rats are not. (115)
High-risk dealing is no longer tied to the “inspired action” and “original judgments” that are
the hallmark of the successful speculator. Packer is on his way to embracing loss as his goal.
And indeed, at the close of the novel’s first part, Packer ecstatically watches the stock ticker
and feels “purified in nameless ways to see prices spiral into lubricious plunge. Yes, the effect
on him was sexual, cunnilingual in particular, and he let his head fall back and opened his
mouth to the sky and rain” (106). At this point, the “joy at all misfortune, in the swift pitch of
markets down” becomes connected with, and is only topped by, existential insecurity: “But it
was the threat of death at the brink of night that spoke to him most surely about some
principle of fate he’d always known would come clear in time. Now he could begin the
business of living” (107).
Eric Packer, it becomes obvious, is on an epic voyage toward purity and clarity, toward a
state of being that will allow him to break through the “occult repose” of the “undead” brought
about by speculating on the future (77). Engaging in risk has trapped him in a temporal state
which DeLillo had already captured in Americana with the help of Augustine: “And never can a
man be more disastrously in death than when death itself shall be deathless” (DeLillo, 1989
[1971]: 21, 99).7 Packer can only escape this disastrous state by giving himself over to
passivity vis-à-vis insecurity and threat, which is to say, to fate. The reversal of the security
apparatus, in short, entails aiming for a relation to the future that the invention of security was
meant to overcome. The aim of Eric’s journey is the recovery of death from deathlessness.
Only if death is resurrected can life become “the business of living”.
Packer’s quest evokes the preoccupation with authenticity in existentialism and, more
broadly, existential philosophy, but it does so in a specific sense. According to a line of thought
that leads from Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Sartre (and that should include Emerson),
authenticity consists in an attitude towards life and death that must be actively achieved. Such
achievement is precisely what Packer’s Odyssey turns out to aim for. However, while
authenticity for these philosophers must be wrested from the forces of social conformity, in
Packer’s world of the market, everyone tries to beat the herd. Authenticity, defined as non-
conformity, is what every speculator aspires to. That is why for Packer, moving towards
authenticity requires more than freeing himself from the force of public opinion. It further
implies, again, breaking free from the Augustinian condition of deathless death.
This is not the place to reconstruct a tradition of philosophical thinking about death as it
comes to bear on DeLillo. I will therefore limit myself to the observation that the stance toward
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which Packer is moving resonates specifically with Heidegger’s notion of Sein zum Tode (being-
toward-death).8 This concept ought not be confused with thinking about the fact that all of us
must die. It rather involves an attachment to life in its scope of possibilities that grows out of
the awareness of one’s very own personal finitude and mortality. From the perspective of
one’s own mortality, death does not appear as a contingent possibility of the future but as a
certainty reaching into present life, even if it remains indefinite when the moment of death will
arrive.9 It is this stance toward death as both certain and indefinite that sets apart authentic
(eigentlich), first-person being from the generalized being that Heidegger denotes with the
German word man (a universalized third-person singular), and that DeLillo associates with the
abstract and timeless third-person consciousness that flourishes in the environment of
speculation. Towards the end of the novel, then, Packer moves towards a reinstatement of
death, time, and the historical. He seems to reestablish the possibility of a life that is mindful
of the future but diverges from “living in the future” insofar as this entails trivializing or even
denying death. The existentially reanimated hero mounts the time of security against the time
of risk.
However, Cosmopolis creates a number of ambiguities in Packer’s existential pursuit,
which it ultimately leaves unresolved: the novel asks whether it is possible at all to break out
of the time of risk once life has been so thoroughly financialized. Moreover, Cosmopolis
suggests that the “business of living” in the face of death has a tendency to move just a little
closer to the edge and become a suicidal death wish. Finally, tying these two problems into
one, DeLillo raises the question of whether the time of security must not be incorporated into
the time of risk if being-toward-death is to serve survival rather than self-annihilation. To bring
out these ambiguities, I will look more closely at the novel’s final pages.
In the drawn-out closing scene, Packer has sought out his prospective murderer in an old
warehouse. A thinly veiled Doppelgänger of Packer’s, who has moreover doubled himself (he
goes by the names of Benno Levin and Richard Sheets) poses as a counterforce to the virtual.
But a second look reveals that Levin is no closer to the real than Packer himself. In fact, he is
caught up in a colloquialism that dissolves the speaking subject into a universal third person.
As he confesses, “I am speaking to someone and hear the sound of my voice, third person,
filling the air around my head” (57–58). Packer is thus thrown back on himself to find his first-
person viewpoint of authentic being-toward-death.
The only avenue left open to Packer is once again to turn what is left of his security
apparatus against himself – this time, against his own body. His meandering verbal
confrontation with Levin leading nowhere, he casually, half-consciously, holds his hand over
the barrel of his gun and pulls the trigger. A “scorch mark” (197) of blood beginning to spread
across his hand, he gets a first inkling of an existentialized alternative to the all-encompassing
cosmopolis of globalized capitalism:
The pain was the world. The mind could not find a place outside it. He could hear the pain, staticky, in his
hand and wrist. He closed his eyes again, briefly. He could feel himself contained in the dark but also just
beyond it, on the lighted outer surface, the other side, belonged to both, feeling both, being himself and
seeing himself. (201)
Even this world of pain retains a trace of its mediality. Pain is a sound – not a sheer,
immediate presence of feeling – whose place, it seems, is elsewhere. It travels across
airwaves and, once picked up, remains intermixed with the white noise of static. Whether there
is a world outside the sign, outside of mediated information, in which there is room for truly
authentic being-toward-death, is rendered questionable. Pain itself is both a whole world and
mediated.
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The capacity of death to lead to authenticity becomes even more dubious as Levin moves
toward fulfilling his task of shooting Packer. Packer sees his own death on the crystal screen of
his high-tech watch, even before he has heard the shot. “His hand contains the pain of his life,
all of it, emotional and other, and he closes his eyes one more time. This is not the end. He is
dead inside the crystal of his watch but still alive in original space, waiting for the shot to
sound” (209). Death – the ultimate instance of authenticity, the experience which, according
to Heidegger, no one can experience in your place – becomes yet another projection of the
future that flickers on a screen. His own death, it seems, has not brought Packer a single iota
closer to breaking out of the time of risk. In fact, it can hardly be called his own death at all.
What’s more, the reduction of death to a digital projection seems to fulfill the longing for
immortality aspired to by the conquering of the future under the aegis of risk: “It is happening
now, an evolutionary advance that needed only the practical mapping of the nervous system
onto digital memory. It would be the master thrust of cyber-capital, to extend the human
experience toward infinity as a medium for corporate growth and investment, for the
accumulation of profits and vigorous reinvestment” (207).
DeLillo, insisting on ambiguity, simultaneously reinforces a belief in the power of pain to
create a pathway to authentic finitude: “But his pain interfered with his immortality. It was
crucial to his distinctiveness, too vital to be bypassed and not susceptible, he didn’t think, to
computer emulation. The things that made him who he was could hardly be identified much
less converted to data” (207). In fact, to the extent that the novel’s final pages do credit pain
with providing a way out of finance capitalism’s temporal imaginary, death comes to seem
more appealing than a life that is mindful of death. Situated in the space between seeing his
death and hearing the shot, the text registers Packer’s suicidal thrust: “Maybe he didn’t want
that life after all […] What did he want that was not posthumous?” (209). It dawns on him that
the loss of his fortune will have real consequences, that he will be “starting over broke, hailing
a cab in a busy intersection filled with jockeying junior executives, arms aloft, bodies smartly
spinning to cover every compass point” – and that he no longer has “the predatory impulse”
(209) for renewed upward mobility into the spheres of abstraction and virtuality.
For Packer, breaking with the virtual – a project initially aimed at recovering a life for the
senses numbed by virtuality – seems to lead straight into an ‘empire of the senseless’, to use
Kathy Acker’s (1988) phrase. It is an empire that is final, total, and definite: cosmopolis has
become necropolis. Alternating between virtual life and death, Packer is incapable of
imagining how to move from virtuality to virtue, that is, how to free himself from the
abstractions of finance capitalism in order to re-embed himself in a social world in which
values are not abstracted and purely self-referential but tied to collective interest.10 Torn
between virtuality and death itself, Packer seems to have lost his way toward the “business of
living”. Yet, the final lines of the novel warrant another look precisely in this respect, for they
seem to redirect the suicidal momentum to survival: “His hand contains the pain of his life, all
of it, emotional and other, and he closes his eyes one more time. This is not the end. He is
dead inside the crystal of his watch but still alive in original space, waiting for the shot to
sound” (209). In two different senses this moment means, of course, precisely the end. In his
‘Confessions’, inserted earlier in the narrative, Benno Levin ponders Packer’s corpse on the
floor of his warehouse apartment. From this we already know he will die this very instant.
Moreover, the course of events and the text metaleptically come to share their ending. The
story of Packer’s voyage reaches its last sentence as he sees the image of his death. And yet,
in Cosmopolis finality arrives in a decidedly indefinite manner. It arrests the interval between
image and sound and keeps Packer waiting indefinitely.
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Peter Boxall (2006: 232) has claimed this moment to mark a radical openness: “[Packer]
occupies a transitional space that does not know yet whether it is a transition. He occupies a
place of pure potential, a space of possibility, that holds itself open for the briefest of periods,
waiting for the shot to sound”. But in what sense can we speak of “a place of pure potential, a
space of possibility” if we know that Packer is mistaken, that this truly is the end? In Boxall’s
reading, potential and possibility open up “for the briefest of periods” in which it is still unclear
to Packer whether the transition actually is a transition. Simply put, as long as the future
moment of the shot has not arrived, Packer cannot know for sure that it will happen. Given the
knowledge of the reader, potentiality, in Boxall’s interpretation, is nothing else than ignorance
on Packer’s part.
In the alternative interpretation I propose here, Packer, at the very end, returns to “the
business of living” in the face of death. The projection of his death on his watch is not
interpreted by Packer as an uncertain sign of the future but instead as a fact. It is because of
the discrepancy between the visual and the aural fact that he becomes keenly alive to his own
existence. The sentence “This is not the end” has a note of surprise and appreciation derived
from the conviction that it is the end. Possibility and potentiality do not refer to the question of
whether the shot will sound or not; they arise from the certainty that it will, but has not yet
done so. Possibility and potentiality, in other words, refer to a particular position toward life
and death: life becomes possible in an authentic manner only once death has been accepted
as a fact.
This attitude I have earlier associated with the time of security, i.e., with a temporality that
is mindful of the individual’s finitude and that leads to an attachment to life in its excitable,
sensory, and unmediated dimension. But if I suggested earlier that Packer’s concern with
security breaks through the time of risk and establishes its own temporality, these last lines of
the novel force us to rephrase this relation. For Packer’s recovery of life-in-waiting is made
possible by the camera and screen inside his watch, the most avant-garde media technology
of the financial risk economy and its corresponding temporal imaginary. Recalling his
economic transactions, Packer’s watch makes the future available by presenting its projection
as a fact: the watch prophetically shows you not what time it is in the present, but what the
future will bring. In the economic realm, treating a projected future as a fact led to disastrous
results that engulfed Packer in the numbness of virtuality. But what gets projected onto his
very personal timepiece is not the future development of prices but the certainty of his death.
Security thus breaks open the time of risk by adopting its aspiration to access and conquer the
future.
In the final analysis, the time of security in Cosmopolis cannot produce an alternative
temporality to the deeply entrenched logic of the world of finance capitalism. What it can do is
transpose the temporal imaginary of late capitalism into an existential key, in which questions
of future investment become questions of finitude and mortality. DeLillo thus dramatizes the
encounter of threat afforded by the concern with security as the gift of death. If this gift
reinstates the privilege of dying, it simultaneously restores the possibility of living a life
oriented to the future. For while modernity may be characterized by contingency, chance, and
the open future, these uncertainties are never to be taken for granted. After all, the project of
modernity has not only consisted in the emancipation from old dogmas that tightly prescribe
the course of the future, but also in the attempt to master and overcome (through techniques
such as risk management) the uncertainties that go along with that emancipation.
The politics of security, no doubt, has had devastating effects. Most immediately, it has
legitimated a seemingly endless war on terror. But while the study of security usually aims to
explain how it is that people can be made to rally around an ideal of security that strives
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toward the diminution of contingency, my reading of DeLillo suggests that we have yet to
properly grasp the imaginative resources of security’s political instrumentalization. DeLillo’s
novel proposes that the cultural fascination with security – which is in fact a preoccupation
with insecurity – in the end may stem from its ability to restore the future’s openness by
perverting the modern project of making the future secure. Only on the face of it, then, does
security aim to extinguish uncertainty. Extrapolating from DeLillo, it appears that security
becomes culturally powerful by rendering itself impossible. In the face of threat, life begins to
flourish anew.
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Notes
1. The phrase ‘culture of fear’ was popularized by sociologist Barry Glassner (1999). For work that
emphasizes the production of fear in the media, see Altheide (2002). On the political grounding of
fear, see Linke and Smith (2009) and Robin (2004). For an argument that emphasizes the link
between fear and state violence, see Asad (2007: 29-31).
2. Brian Massumi, one of the leading proponents of affect theory, has developed the same claim in a
series of essays going back to the early 1990s. In a 2005 article, Massumi applied this idea to the
Bush administration, which he claims had managed to create a remote-control for the body politic
by installing a color alert system after 9/11: “Addressing bodies from the dispositional angle of
their affectivity, instead of addressing subjects from the positional angle of their ideations, shunts
government function away from the mediations of adherence or belief and toward direct
activation” (Massumi, 2005: 34).
3. For a more detailed account, see Voelz (2018).
4. DeLillo (2003: 7); in the following discussion, quotations are taken from this edition and are
acknowledged by page numbers in parentheses in the body of text.
5. A ‘haircut’ is also a technical term in finance, but here the meaning is ultimately the opposite. The
technical term refers to the difference between the market value of an asset and the amount for
which it can be used as a collateral. The size of the haircut depends on the riskiness of the asset;
a ‘haircut’, in other words, is a preemptive safety measure against risk. Thus taken in the
colloquial sense, Packer’s getting a haircut suggests that he is courting loss; understood in the
technical sense, he is insuring himself against it. The novel, as I will argue, exploits this very
ambiguity. I thank Christian Kloeckner for pointing out the different meanings of the phrase to me.
6. Even more damning was James Wood (2003) in The New Republic, who detected an excessive
pathos in DeLillo’s style that results in a rhetorical insolvency comparable to Packer’s financial
ruin. Wood submits that as DeLillo’s prose throughout the book “races ahead of the actual
importance of its subject”, near the end, “when he seeks to raise some moral equity”, his “already
half-mortgaged language” leaves him “without the means” (Wood, 2003: n.p.).
7. The quote is taken from The City of God, Book 13, Chapter 11, in which the chapter headline reads:
“Whether one can both be living and dead at the same time” (Augustine, 1884: 531).
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8. Heidegger discusses authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and ‘being-toward-death’ in the first chapter of
Division 2 in Being and Time (1962 [1927]: §47–53, 281-311). I do not claim an influence of
Heidegger on DeLillo here, but merely show a resonance.
9. Heidegger writes, “The ownmost possibility, which is non-relational, not to be outstripped, and
certain, is indefinite as regards its certainty” (1962 [1927]: 310).
10. Russell Scott Valentino (2007: 144) reads the novel to suggest that “the conceptual thread from
the bodily foundations of virtue to the absent body of virtuality shows, on one hand, a gradual de-
corporealization of value in modern life and, on the other, a range of human reactions to the
increasing centrality of this ‘symbolic public order’ from euphoria to anxiety to madness”. Packer,
he argues, is a “kosmou polites [who] recognizes neither the representative nor the fact of the res
publica” (Valentino, 2007: 153). Considering that Packer’s numbness in the time of risk results in
part from his isolation, getting ready to begin "the business of living" (107) would indeed have to
make room for some form of socially embedded being. Yet the only collective which Packer can
envision is the corporation made up of conformity and competition. His notion of the embedded
individual reverts to “jockeying junior executives” (209); i.e., ‘organization man’ (Whyte, 1956).
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